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The aim of this paper is to scrutinise the necessary conditions for a specific
mathematical principle to be ontologically committing and, as such, to iden-
tify the source of its ontological commitments. The principle in question is
Hume’s Principle – a statement that embedded in second-order logic allows
for a deduction of the second-order Peano axioms.1 This principle is at the
heart of the so-called Neo-Fregean programme as defended by Bob Hale and
Crispin Wright.2 Once it is clear what the source of the commitment to in-
finitely many objects of Hume’s Principle is, we should be able to re-evaluate
the debate between the Neo-Fregeans – who defend Hume’s Principle as an
∗University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, p.a.ebert@stir.ac.uk
1This theorem, known as Frege’s theorem, was first explicitly noted by Parsons, in his
(Parsons, 1965) and later independently rediscovered in (Wright, 1983), pp. 158–169. It
was most likely known to Frege himself (see (Heck, 1993)). More recent presentations of
the proof can be found in (Boolos, 1987a) (discursive), (Boolos, 1990) (rigourous), (Boolos,
1995), and (Boolos, 1996). Note that even a weaker version of Hume’s Principle – Finite
Hume – suffices for this derivation; see (Heck, 1997). Second-order logic is required for
this proof. A relatively moderate portion of second-order logic suffices, however: Π11
comprehension is enough. (Linnebo, 2004) has shown that Frege’s Theorem cannot be
proven in predicative second-order logic using Frege’s own definition of the arithmetical
primitives. (Heck, 2006) provides a proof that ramified second-order logic suffices. For a
general overview of the technical details of Fregean arithmetic, see (Burgess, 2005).
2The main sources for a defence of the Neo-Fregean programme are (Wright, 1983),
(Hale, 1987) and (Hale and Wright, 2001).
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analytic principle – and the so-called epistemic rejectionists3 – who deny its
analytic status. The conclusions can then be generalised to other abstraction
principles, principle that share a similar form to Hume’s Principle.4
In the first section, I will clarify what epistemic rejectionism is committed
to and provide a theoretical basis for the position by introducing the notion
of presumptuousness as the underlying criterion on the basis of which Hume’s
Principle is to be rejected as an analytic principle. Then, I will review certain
results given in (Shapiro and Weir, 2000) and in more formal detail by (Cook,
2003a) which prima facie put pressure on epistemic rejectionism. In section
4, I will propose a short thought-experiment to highlight the problem for
epistemic rejectionism posed by the formal results and then suggest various
responses on behalf of the epistemic rejectionist. The upshot will be to elicit a
new and very basic disagreement between epistemic rejectionism and the Neo-
Fregeans which will provide a new angle to properly assess and re-evaluate
the current debate.
1 Boolos’s epistemic rejectionism and the con-
dition of presumptuousness
Epistemic rejectionism repudiates the core idea of Neo-Fregeanism: Namely
that certain mathematical principles – in particular certain abstraction prin-
ciples – are analytic truths despite the fact that they have specific ontological
commitments. Instead, the epistemic rejectionist claims that if a principle
3The position is labelled epistemic rejectionism since what it rejects is that HP is a truth
that is knowable on analytic grounds. This is in contrast to rejectionism (simpliciter), a
position that rejects the truth of HP if it is taken at face-value, i.e. as referring to numbers
as abstract entities.
4An abstraction principle is of the following form:
∀α∀β(ξ(α) = ξ(β)↔ α ≈ β)
where ξ is a term-forming operator applicable to expression of the type of α and β and
≈ is an equivalence relation on entities denoted by expressions of that type. Hume’s
Principle has the form of an abstraction principles (equinumerosity is the relevant equiv-
alence relations). Frege’s ill-fated Basic Law V is also an abstraction principle (involving
co-extensionality as the relevant equivalence relation).
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has ontological commitments then it cannot be regarded as an analytic truth.
So characterised, epistemic rejectionism adopts what Tennant once called the
fourth dogma of empiricism for mathematical principles, i.e. “having existen-
tial commitments entails syntheticity.”5
In this paper, I will focus mainly on George Boolos’ arguments and con-
siderations.6 Boolos’ specific formulation of the worry can be found in the
suitably entitled paper “Is Hume’s Principle analytic?” Importantly, his re-
flections do not only apply to Hume’s Principle, but more generally to any
abstraction principle and, for that matter, to any axiom or implicit definition
that has existential commitments.
Boolos’ view is that statements that are analytic involve (at least) two
components: “Firstly, they are true; secondly and roughly speaking, they lack
content, i.e. they make no significant or substantive claims or commitments
about the way the world is; in particular, they do not entail the existence
either of particular objects or of more than one object.”7 More precisely, and
concerning Hume’s Principle (HP), Boolos continues: “The main significant
worry for the defender of the analyticity of HP concerns the quite strong
content that it appears to possess.”8 Namely, “if HP holds [. . . ] there must
be infinitely many objects”9, and so he concludes: “[HP] taken as an axiom,
might then entail that, for example there are many, many objects, too many
for it to be capable of being regarded any longer as analytic.”10
Importantly, however, we need to ask under what conditions does Hume’s
Principle have a commitment to infinitely many objects and which compo-
nent of the principle is it that generates these commitments? Standardly, in
order to discern the ontological commitments of a theory or a principle, one
5(Tennant, 1997), p. 303. It is, of course, also a dogma of Kantian Philosophy.
6See especially (Boolos, 1997). There are similar thoughts in his earlier papers, for
example (Boolos, 1987a), (Boolos, 1987b) and (Boolos, 1990). In some his papers, Field
adopts what I label epistemic rejectionism. See for example his review article (Field, 1984)
of (Wright, 1983) – however, Field is here not only concerned with analyticity but he also
rejects the thought that ontologically committing mathematical principles are a priori
knowable.
7(Boolos, 1997), p.303
8op. cit., p. 304
9op.cit., p. 306
10op. cit., p.309, my italics
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consults the corresponding Ramsey sentence(s) of the theory or the principle
in question to read off its ontological commitments. So, in the case of Hume’s
Principle, we get the following statement:
Ramsified Hume’s Principle (RHP)
∃η∀f∀g(ηf = ηg ↔ f ∼ g)11
That is, Hume’s Principle commits one to the existence of a higher-order
function – an entity, whichever it is that maps concepts on to objects, giving
distinct values for each pair of non-equinumerous concepts. So, it may seem
that in the case of Hume’s Principle it is the existence of this function which
is problematic and can’t be assumed on purely analytic grounds since it is
this function that involves an implicit commitment to infinitely many objects.
This seems to be exactly what Boolos has in mind in the following passage:
Our present difficulty is this: just how do we know, what kind
of guarantee do we have, why should we believe, that there is a
function that maps concepts to objects in the way that the deno-
tation of octothorpe [the symbol Boolos used to denote the num-
ber function] does if HP is true? If there is such a function then
it is quite reasonable to think that whichever function octothorpe
denotes, it maps non-equinumerous concepts to different objects
and equinumerous ones to the same object, and this moreover
because of the meaning of octothorpe, the number-of-sign or the
phrase “the number of”. But do we have any analytic guarantee
that there is a function that works in the appropriate manner?
((Boolos, 1997), p. 306, my italics)
Thus, Boolos believes that it is, we might say, presumptuous to assume that
we can have an analytic guarantee – and with this I presume he means a
justification on purely analytic grounds – for the existence of such a function
since it has very specific demands on the object level. In particular, in the
case of Hume’s Principle, the relevant function commits one to the existence
11‘η’ is a variable ranging over functions from properties to objects and ‘f ∼ g’ means
that there is a one-to-one relation between the f’s and the g’s.
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of too many objects. Thus, as a reconstruction of Boolos’ thought and so of
the epistemic rejectionist in general, we can put forward the following general
criterion of presumptuousness :
Criterion of Presumptuousness
Assuming on a purely analytic basis the existence of a function is
presumptuous, if and only if its application has further ontological
commitment on the object level.
In order to be more precise we now have to clarify the notion of further
ontological commitment. Boolos’ worry about the commitments of Hume’s
Principle concern the demands on the cardinality of the world for this ab-
straction principle to be true. For, as Boolos says, if Hume’s Principle is
true, there will have to be infinitely many objects and thus there will have
to be “many, many objects, too many for it to be capable of being regarded
as analytic.”12 As a result, we can best interpret him adopting the following
notion of further ontological commitment :
Further Ontological Commitment
A function has further ontological commitment if the assumption
of its existence commits one to the existence of at least κ-many
objects in the first-order domain, whereas κ is such that it has at
least cardinality ℵ0.13
So, we now have a notion of presumptuousness and further ontological com-
mitments to underwrite the epistemic rejectionist complaint that the Neo-
Fregean presumptuously assumes the existence of the function referred to by
the number-operator in Hume’s Principle. On this conception, Hume’s Prin-
ciple clearly is presumptuous as it entails the existence of infinitely many
12op. cit., p.309
13Note that there might well be other interpretations of the idea of further ontological
commitments. Maybe κ should be chosen to be finite or so that even one object is too
many in Boolos’ sense and thus presumptuous. We will discuss other interpretations,
which depart from Boolos’ original idea in section 5. It is also noteworthy here that this
interpretation of Boolos assumes the axiom of (countable) choice, so that there being
too-many, i.e. infinitely many objects entails there being ℵ0-many objects.
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objects and thus ℵ0-many objects. Since, according to Boolos, no analytic
principle can itself commit one to the existence of that many things, Hume’s
Principle can’t be an analytic truth. I believe that it is this notion of pre-
sumptuousness together with the just characterised notion of further onto-
logical commitments that best captures Boolos’ original complaint.
In the following, I want further to explore the epistemic rejectionist’s
thought by discussing different background assumptions. As noted by Hale
and Wright on various occasions14, Hume’s Principle itself does not entail
the truth of instances of the right-hand side; rather, it is only in conjunction
with further – presumably necessary – truths that Hume’s Principle entails
the existence of infinitely many objects. In the next section, I want to exhibit
how crucial this additional component is, and that it is not without additional
non-trivial assumptions that Hume’s Principle is ontologically committing.
To this end, I will briefly discuss two different metaphysical pictures giving
rise to two different comprehension schemes which, as I will show, affect the
presumptuousness of the introduction of the operator involved in Hume’s
Principle.
2 Different comprehension schemes
There have been a number of previous discussions of aristotelian logic and
Hume’s Principle.15 Hume’s Principle is a statement in second-order logic
which involves higher-order quantification. Higher-order quantification itself
raises various questions and here we need to distinguish a number of inter-
related issues pertaining to the domain of quantification of the higher-order
quantifiers.
One issue is what kinds of entities are in the domain of the higher-order
quantifier, another is how many of these entities are there and lastly, what
does it take to be in the domain of the higher-order quantifers. Leaving
14See e.g. (Hale and Wright, 2000), p. 146 (Wright, 1990) (p.162f) and (Hale, 1994)
(p.184) (as quoted from (Hale and Wright, 2001))
15It is first mentioned in (Shapiro and Weir, 2000) and recently worked out in formal
details in (Cook, 2003a).
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aside the first question and thus issues raised by Quine, Boolos and many
others16, let us grant the existence of properties as the entities that higher-
order quantifiers range over and focus on the second and third issue. In the
context of this paper, I won’t argue for a specific answer to these questions;
rather I would like to note that two traditional positions on what it takes for
a property to exist can be distinguished, which leads to different conceptions
of how many properties there are.
We can distinguish an aristotelian conception from a platonist conception.
What it takes for a property to exist, according to the aristotelian, is that
the property has to be in rebus. Roughly speaking, properties are concrete
universals that exist provided that they are exemplified by a concrete object.
The platonist, in contrast, has no such restriction, rather properties are ante
rem and their existence does not depend on whether they are concretely
instantiated or not.
As a result, how many properties one thinks there are depends upon the
metaphysical framework that is adopted. For the platonist – translated into
modern philosophers’ “slang” – standard comprehension is true, while the
aristotelian, on the other hand, insists on a modification of the standard
comprehension scheme, since only those properties that are instantiated (in
rebus) exist. So, the modern platonist embraces the following unconditional
comprehension scheme:
Full comprehension scheme (FCS)
∃F∀x1, x2, . . . , xn(Fx1, x2, . . . , xn ↔ φx1, x2, . . . , xn)
while the modern aristotelian would embrace the following conditional com-
prehension scheme:
Aristotelian comprehension scheme (ACS)17
16See (Quine, 1986) for his notorious “Wolf in sheep’s clothing” – phrase and (Boolos,
1985), and (Boolos, 1984) for Boolos’ suggestion of plural interpretation of the second-
order quantifiers. See also (Rossberg, 2006) for defending the view that higher-order
quantification does not involve any kinds of entities.
17There are various ways of characterising the aristotelian comprehension scheme. An
interesting question is whether the aristotelian should be characterised as an agnostic
about the empty property, rather than a believer in the non-existence of this property.
Here I won’t dwell on the agnostic characterisation.
7
∃x1, x2, . . . , xnφx1, x2, . . . , xn → ∃F∀x1, x2, . . . , xn(Fx1, x2, . . . , xn ↔
φx1, x2, . . . , xn)
Let us assume that both positions are genuine positions in metaphysics in
that each conception can be sufficiently motivated (at least from a neutral
position). Also, let us assume that these different metaphysical pictures
can lead to the adoption of different comprehension schemes. A platonist
will adopt standard comprehension, while an aristotelian will adopt a dif-
ferent comprehension scheme since his existence criterion for properties is
constrained to those that are instantiated. What I will show in the next
section, is that these two distinct positions that are reflected in two different
comprehension schemes have a major effect on the issue of presumptuousness.
3 Hume’s Principle within an aristotelian
framework
First, we need to note the interesting result that the standard proof for the
existence of infinitely many numbers on the basis of Hume’s Principle does
not go through without the existence of the empty property. Intuitively, this
is because within the aristotelian framework it can’t be proven that there
are n + 1 numbers less than or equal to n.18 When embedded in a logic
with an aristotelian comprehension scheme, Hume’s Principle hardly entails
any additional ontological commitments. Cook19 shows that if there is a
non-empty universe, then Hume’s Principle only entails the existence of the
number 1 (but not 0), otherwise Hume’s Principle in an aristotelian setting
is satisfiable on the empty domain.
Having this result in place, how does it affect our previous discussion
of the presumptuousness of Hume’s Principle? Adopting the conception of
further ontological commitment outlined before and thus regarding commit-
ments as critical once they are too many in the sense of at least ℵ0-many,
Hume’s Principle, with respect to the aristotelian comprehension, is not pre-
18See especially (Shapiro and Weir, 2000), p.168 where this result is further explained.
19In his (Cook, 2003a)
8
sumptuous! All Hume’s Principle will give us, in this setting, is an addi-
tional commitment to the number 1, i.e. to one more object; it will never
inflate an originally finite domain to an infinite one. So, assuming I cor-
rectly reflected Boolos’ thoughts, the epistemic rejectionist seems committed
to regard Hume’s Principle, if embedded in an aristotelian framework, as
non-presumptuous. It does not involve the existence of too many objects, i.e.
ℵ0-many objects.
This result is already interesting since it further elaborates, and gives cre-
dence to, the thought that it is not Hume’s Principle itself that entails the
existence of infinitely many objects; rather additional assumptions regarding
which properties exist have to be in place.20 The following section will intro-
duce a puzzle about the ontological commitments of Hume’s Principle based
on these formal results which puts pressure on the epistemic rejectionist po-
sition and their conception of presumptuousness.
4 A puzzle about Hume’s Principle
Consider the following story:
“Imagine a young upcoming logician/philosopher, well-trained and a com-
mitted epistemic rejectionist, who thinks that it is impossible to have a purely
analytic guarantee for any principles that involves a presumptuous function.
However, our logician/philosopher – call him George – is also an aristotelian,
thus he thinks that only properties exist that are instantiated. Well, now
let George come across Hume’s Principle (as a good logician should); having
20Shapiro and Weir (see their (Shapiro and Weir, 2000) especially p.168ff.) makes it seem
as if the empty property is what is responsible for the ontological commitments. They
write: “The neo-logicist cannot claim, then, that the existence of infinitely many numbers
is demonstrable in an epistemically innocent fashion unless he or she can show that it is
demonstrable, in such an epistemically innocent fashion, that there is an uninstantiated
property. [. . . ] The ‘aristotelian neo-logicist’ will, it is true, be able to prove
(∃F∀y¬Fy → Inf)
where Inf is a theorem of infinity; that is, if an empty property exists then there are
infinitely many numbers.” (op.cit) The following discussion will, I hope, clarify the points
raised in their discussion.
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studied it, he does not have any complaints about Hume’s Principle at least
none on the grounds of the constraint of presumptuousness. Thus, assum-
ing the principle fulfils other constraints which are necessary for its success
(and assume that nothing else stands in the way of regarding it as analytic)
George is content to claim to know Hume’s Principle as an analytic principle.
Now, as it happens George visits St. Andrews one day, encounters some
philosophers there and by talking to them, he becomes convinced that he
should allow the empty property within his metaphysics. That is he changes
his metaphysics of properties from an aristotelian conception to a platonist
one.
But George has been set up by those philosophers. Having changed his
metaphysical framework, they challenge him to explain how his change is
compatible with his position as a committed epistemic rejectionist and his
previous endorsement on purely analytic grounds of Hume’s Principle.
The problem thus is that George has previously accepted the existence
of the number-function (i.e. the truth of the Ramsey-sentence of HP) while
accepting aristotelian metaphysics. But by adopting a different metaphysical
conception (whose only relevant difference is that it involves the existence of
one more property), the number function picked out by Hume’s Principle has
become presumptuous !”
So what is George to do? Let me outline the above puzzle in more detail
and develop it as a challenge to, or rather reductio of, epistemic rejectionism.
This is followed by a discussion of different lines of reply to this challenge.
Premise 1
The existence of the number-function picked out by Hume’s Prin-
ciple in aristotelian logic is not presumptuous, and thus (assuming
it fulfils other relevant criteria) is acceptable on analytic grounds.
10
Premise 2
Changing the underlying metaphysics from aristotelian to non-
aristotelian does not change the analytic grounds for accepting a
principle and it is in this respect an innocuous change.
Conclusion
As the existence of the function, denoted by the number-operator
is already accepted on analytic grounds, a rejectionist is commit-
ted to allowing the analytically justified claim of the existence of
infinitely many objects.
and the underlying major premise of this reasoning is:
Major Premise
The nature of the number-function is independent of the exis-
tence of the empty property, i.e. making such justified changes
in the metaphysical picture has no bearing on the identity of the
number-function.
In the following, I will discuss the different claims of the argument in turn
and suggest various replies that can be made to each premise.21
4.1 Rejecting premise 1
One line of response is to reject the first premise. Here, one might doubt this
claim on the grounds that appreciating that Hume’s Principle is presumptu-
ous in a platonistic metaphysics shows that it is presumptuous tout court. In
21One referee observed that the full ontological commitments of HP (i.e. commitments
to infinity) re-emerge even on an Aristotelian framework provided one has an a priori proof
of the existence of at least one non-number, or alternatively, if one adopts certain modal
consideration. This type of reasoning is not without its own presuppositions (Caesar-
type worries about the former, the relevant strength of modal considerations (S5) on the
other). Furthermore, we could add further twists to the initial story to neutralise such
undermining assumption, which is why I will not further discuss them here. Nevertheless,
his observations point to the fact that changing other background assumptions can have
similar results even within the aristotelian setting. We could, for example, easily create
another puzzle: have George be an Atheist and then later, on becoming a Theist – while
retaining his aristotelian comprehension scheme – he comes to acknowledge new ontological
commitments of HP! I won’t discuss this puzzle here.
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both definitions (that is Hume’s Principle embedded in aristotelian and em-
bedded in platonist comprehension) the number operator refers to the same
function, only that its occurrence in the platonist framework shows that the
principle is presumptuous.
This line of reply, however, is unattractive if the sole reason for George
to give up Hume’s Principle is on the ground of its “potential” presumptu-
ousness. It would seem that rejecting the first premise on this basis in order
to avoid the puzzle presupposes that the platonist conception has a somehow
higher priority over the aristotelian framework in evaluating the ontological
commitments of a principle. Consequently, what matters concerning the no-
tion of presumptuousness would have to be rephrased in order to properly
reflect the epistemic rejectionist’s reasoning, if this strategy were pursued,
such that:
Strong condition of presumptuousness
Assuming on a purely analytic basis the existence of a function is
presumptuous, if and only if its application has further ontologi-
cal commitment on the object level in a platonist comprehension
scheme.
This change of the condition of presumptuousness is clearly unattractive since
it demands that even a committed aristotelian should take into account the
possibility of further ontological commitments in the platonist framework –
which, one might well have supposed, should not matter to him. Therefore,
rejecting the first premise is not an attractive strategy.
4.2 Rejecting premise 2
The second premise comprises the claim that a change from an aristotelian
to a platonistic metaphysics of properties is innocuous with respect to the
analytic grounds for accepting a principle. This claim can obviously be chal-
lenged in various ways. Let us here first scrutinise what exactly a change of
metaphysical framework involves.
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What might well be called an ‘inconsequential’ change in our metaphysical
conception would involve merely the quantity of properties that one assumes
to exist. On the platonistic conception for example, there exists one more
property – the empty property – that doesn’t feature in the aristotelian
conception. One view then, is that the aristotelian properties are of the
same kind as the platonistic ones; the two frameworks just differ in terms of
what properties that are out there.
In contrast, a more substantial understanding of the change takes into
account the kind of motivation for adopting one conception over the other.
As mentioned before, an aristotelian and a platonist differ in what it takes
for a property to exist. While the former considers properties as concrete
universals, existing in rebus, the platonist conceives of properties as pure
universals existing as abstract entities. This difference might then not only
give rise to a different answer to the question of how many properties are
there, but also might lead one to suppose that the kinds of properties are
substantially different in the different metaphysical settings. Therefore, since
there are different kinds of properties involved in the different metaphysical
views merely changing the comprehension scheme is not enough to accurately
reflect the change: Different kinds of properties bring with them a different
senses for principles such as Hume’s Principle, i.e. the sense of the number-
operator is substantially different in both cases. On this basis, one may
argue that a transition from an aristotelian to a platonistic framework is not
innocuous: it might well be that the “analytic grounds” will not be the same
on the different conceptions since the sense of the number-operator changes.
In turn, this result could be used as a motivation to reject the Major Premise,
and so argue that different functions are being picked out by the expression
“the number of” within the different metaphysical frameworks – different,
since they have different kinds of entities as arguments.
So, an important lesson – a lesson that is missing from the discussion of
(Shapiro and Weir, 2000) and (Cook, 2003a) – is that unless one looks more
closely at the views underlying the respective comprehension schemes, many
crucial metaphysical issues remain untouched. However, is the possibility of
the ‘substantial reading’ of change enough to defuse the puzzle?
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I think the following formal move can be used to re-instantiate the puz-
zle, at least in the case of Hume’s Principle: Instead of conceiving of the
number operator as denoting a function from properties to numbers, one
could regard it as a function from the Fregean extensions of properties to
numbers (thereby relying, to be sure on a suitably restricted version of Basic
Law V22). Presumably, even if one should regard platonist properties as dis-
tinct in kind from aristotelian properties, the extensions of such properties
do overlap. To use an example, we may grant that the platonistic property
which holds just of Hale and Wright is distinct from the aristotelian prop-
erty which holds just of Hale and Wright, as the former is ante rem while the
latter is in rebus. Nonetheless, the extension of the former property is iden-
tical to the extension of the latter and so the worry about the substantiality
of the transition from aristotelian conception of properties to a platonistic
conception should not get a grip here. The function involved in this revised
version of Hume’s Principle is a function from objects to objects and so, the
substantiality of a change in one’s metaphysics of properties, does not have
a bearing on whether this function from objects to objects is the same.
Before tackling the issue raised in the Major Premise, i.e. whether the
function (be it the standard version or the above revised version) may be
viewed as denoting the same function in both aristotelian and platonist com-
prehension schemes23, let me discuss a further attempt to challenge premise
2.
Another way to reject the premise is to point out that whereas in the
aristotelian setting George knows, or at least is in a position to know, HP as
an analytic truth, he is surely not – in a platonist setting – in a position to
know HP on purely analytic grounds, for the fact that HP is presumptuous
will act as a defeater to his (presumed) knowledge of HP. Therefore, a change
in the metaphysical setting is non-innocuous with respect to the analytic
grounds since the change of metaphysical setting will undermine George’s
previous knowledge of HP as an analytic truth. Thus – so this reply goes
22As, for example, suggested by (Boolos, 1989) or (Cook, 2003b)
23If the above formal trick is used the Major Premise has to be suitably revised: The is-
sue becomes whether the identity of the number-function is affected by the (non-) existence
of the extension of the empty property.
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– the very fact that George cannot be credited with knowledge of HP as
an analytic truth within the platonist setting undermines the viability of
premise 2.
Various points can be made in response to this concern. First, we need to
be clear what principle it is that he fails to know – or looses his knowledge of
– when the metaphysical setting changes. On the assumption that the Major
Premise does not hold, HParistotelian and HPplatonist will pick out different
functions. Thus, it can then be argued that premise 2 holds, since, even
in a platonist framework, George is still in a position to know HParistotelian
on analytic grounds, whereas he is not in a position to know HPplatonist on
analytic grounds – hence a change from an aristotelian to a platonistic meta-
physics of properties is innocuous with respect to the analytic grounds for
accepting a specific principle [namely HParistotelian]. If however, the Major
Premise does hold, then the above considerations against premise 2 might
gain some support since both HParistotelian and HPplatonist will pick out the
same number-function yet it is the status as an analytic truth of the latter
that is defeated by the presumptuousness of the principle.24 What this shows
is that again much will hinge on the acceptance (or non-acceptance) of the
Major Premise and it is this crucial premise that I will discuss in the next
section.25
4.3 Rejecting the Major Premise
The standard conception for the identity-conditions of functions spells mat-
ters out extensionally. So, the identity-conditions of a function depend upon
the entities that do figure as arguments and values of the function. On the
standard view, if two functions have the same inputs but provide different
outputs, then the functions are distinct. Thus, the epistemic rejectionist
could maintain that the number-function from properties to objects – or, the
24Whether or not this is sufficient to reject premise 2 is debatable. To evaluate this
it would have to be clarified exactly what it is that is part of the “analytic grounds”
for accepting a principle and to what extent they have to figure as part of the reason for
George to accept a principle. This is a discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
25I’m very grateful for comments of an anonymous referee on this section.
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number-function from extensions of properties to objects – in an aristotelian
setting, is a different function from the one embedded in a platonistic set-
ting. This, for the simple reason that Hume’s Principleplatonist entails the ex-
istence of infinitely many objects, while the latter Hume’s Principlearistotelian
does not. This observation can then motivate the rejection of the Major
Premise and gives credence to the thought that different entities are denoted
by the number-operator occurring in Hume’s Principleplatonist and Hume’s
Principlearistotelian.
However, one motivation for thinking that the Major Premise holds, is
to think of identity-conditions for functions non-extensionally. Think of the
operator involved in Hume’s Principle in analogy to a “vending machine”.
Given a certain input (properties) the vending machine (Hume’s Principle)
gives you a certain output (objects). But the peculiarity about this particular
“machine” – the number-function involved in Hume’s Principle – is that by
giving it the “magic first coin” (the empty property) it not only returns you
the “product” (number), but also guarantees that anytime this is repeated
with a different “coin”, a further new “coin” is issued, which enables you to
do the same again and again, so to get infinitely many “products”.
However, and here the analogy becomes relevant to the issue at hand, no
matter what “coins” are given to the machine – whether you start with the
magic one or not – the nature and constitution of the machine is the same.
So, spelling out this metaphor, if we accept Hume’s Principle embedded
within aristotelian logic we encounter the same function as in the platonist
case. The coins (properties) themselves and the amount of coins (properties)
may change from one metaphysical setting to another but the nature of the
machine (Hume’s Principle) stays the same. Hume’s Principleplatonist involves
the same function and indeed is the same principle as Hume’s Principlearistotelian,
although different consequences can be deduced in the different metaphysical
settings.
Do these considerations help us to see how we should conceive of the
dialectic between the epistemic rejectionist on the one hand and the Neo-
Fregean on the other? I will draw together the major points and diagnose in
what position we now find ourselves.
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5 Diagnosis: Rejectionism rejected?
The puzzle about the ontological commitments of Hume’s Principle was intro-
duced to make the point vivid that Hume’s Principle, and other abstraction
principles, do not commit to objects all by themselves; rather other com-
ponents have to be in place. The puzzle was used to put pressure on the
epistemic rejectionist view and the notion of presumptuousness as charac-
terised above. Hume’s Principle embedded in aristotelian logic is not pre-
sumptuous26 so, if it is assumed that the identity of the function involved
in Hume’s Principle is invariant with respect to a change of the underlying
comprehension scheme, the principle should also be non-presumptuous in a
platonist framework. This conclusion could then be regarded as a reductio
of the notion of presumptuousness presupposed by epistemic rejectionism.
We have seen that there is at least one way to avoid this problematic con-
clusion for the epistemic rejectionist, namely by denying the Major Premise
(i.e. the invariance claim) on the basis of an extensional conception of prop-
erties. Here, I won’t be able to foreclose this way out for the rejectionist.
Thus, a main issue for further discussion remains the question whether the
identity of functions should be characterised extensionally or not. If there are
independent reasons for a non-extensional treatment, then the force of the
puzzle is reinstated and the threat for the viability of epistemic rejectionism
will return.27 Furthermore, we should also appreciate the more general les-
son noted above, that focusing exclusively on Hume’s Principle per se (and
so abstraction principles simpliciter) in the discussion of ontological commit-
ments is at least potentially confusing, at worst wrong! We should always
keep in mind the necessary presuppositions, which go beyond mere logical
reasoning; instead, as I argued, they are to be located within the metaphysics
26Pace the considerations mentioned in fn 21.
27If that is the right analysis, it seems that we can put further, at least prima facie,
pressure on an extensional treatment of functions. Consider for example the Direction
Abstraction: Should it really matter to the identity of the direction-function how many
lines there are? I think not, still I will here have to leave a fuller investigation of this next
round of discussion to another occasion. Note also, that if the Major Premise is to hold, it
might be more tempting for the epistemic rejectionist to reject premise 2 as mentioned in
the previous section. Again, I will have to leave a more detailed discussion of this further
epicycles to another occasion.
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of properties and the metaphysics of logic.
Stepping back a bit from the details of the above puzzle, another lesson to
draw from the discussion might be to reconsider, in more detail, the notion of
further ontological commitments as extracted from Boolos’ quotations. The
initial interpretation is, I think, closest to Boolos’ conception and concerns
the commitment to infinitely many (i.e. too many) objects by accepting
Hume’s Principle. However, maybe a different characterisation can be inde-
pendently motivated which would avoid the problematic result of classifying
Hume’s Principle embedded in an aristotelian comprehension scheme as non-
presumptuous and presumptuous in a platonist comprehension scheme. For
example, the following notion of further ontological commitments would have
the desired result:
Further Ontological Commitment II
A function has further ontological commitment if the assumption
of its existence commits one to the existence of more objects on
any domain.
So, the idea is that, whenever a function commits one to the existence of
one or more objects on an arbitrary domain, then it has further ontological
commitments. In particular, Hume’s Principle embedded in an aristotelian
setting would have further ontological commitments since it commits one
to the existence of one more object (namely 1) on any non-empty domain.
Thus, on this conception of further ontological commitments, the above puzzle
would not get off the ground since Hume’s Principle would be presumptuous
in both the aristotelian and platonist setting. However, this notion is not
what Boolos himself had in mind and another story will have to be told to
motivate this conception.
Further, there are other interesting conceptions of the notion of further
ontological commitments. For example, another view might take into account
the kinds of objects that are introduced. So, rather than merely focusing
on the effects on the cardinality by adopting Hume’s principle, one might
be concerned about the new kinds of objects – namely numbers – that are
introduced by Hume’s Principle. This discussion, however, would presuppose
18
a solution to the well-known Caesar problem and the not so well-known
C-R problem.28 Again, adopting such a conception of further ontological
commitments might, in the end, help the epistemic rejectionist to diffuse the
above puzzle. Here, I can only indicate different possible ways to characterise
this crucial notion underlying the rejectionist conception and will leave a
critical discussion to a further occasion.
To conclude, I think that a fair evaluation of the status belli between
the epistemic rejectionist and the Neo-Fregean is that it has reached a stale-
mate. Epistemic rejectionism, if characterised in terms of the adoption of the
additional constraint of presumptuousness that I outlined in the beginning,
will happily embrace an extensional conception of operators and functions,
while his opponent will be tempted to accept a non-extensional conception.
And while the former will accept the fourth dogma of empiricism, the latter
will see the case of mathematics as a reason to reject it – another case of
“one man’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens”29. Despite this lack
of conclusively rejecting either Neo-Fregeanism or epistemic rejectionism, I
hope, however, to have clarified, structured and advanced this discussion and
pointed towards future avenues of how this debate should be pursued.30
28This is a special version of the Caesar problem which might be left untouched by a
solution to the usual Caesar problem. For a discussion of the C-R problem, see (Cook and
Ebert, 2005)
29(Boolos, 1997), p.308
30I wish to thank the audience of various Arche´ Seminars in St Andrews for their com-
ments and discussion. Special thanks to Roy T. Cook, Marcus Rossberg and Crispin
Wright for commenting and discussing earlier drafts of this paper. Also, I wish to thank
two anonymous referees for their very helpful comments.
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